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THE PARADOXICAL CORPORATE AND 
SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS OF COUNSEL 
SERVING ON THE CLIENT’S BOARD 
JAMES D. COX* 
Lawyers are not plumbers, although many who are lawyers, not to 
mention their clients, may have cause to question why this is so. The 
difference is not the apparel that each wears when performing a task for 
the client. Nor is the difference that one works more frequently below the 
desk than does the other. What separates lawyers from so many worthy 
callings is that lawyers are members of a profession, both socially and 
vocationally. Plumbers are only vocationally professionals.  
A profession is not distinguished by the fact the pay is good and the 
work steady. Rather, it is the responsibilities assumed by those who are its 
members that distinguishes their trade as a profession. These 
responsibilities run not merely to the client, but are even more broadly 
directed to many facets of society. Hence, the lawyer has obligations to his 
client, but also the court and sometimes even third parties. It is the 
existence of these responsibilities that distinguish a true profession from 
other purely commercial vocations.1 There has been extensive 
commentary published on whether lawyers who serve on their client’s 
board of directors seriously compromise their professionalism by doing so. 
The arguments on both sides are now well understood. The vortex of this 
debate swirls about whether such services compromises the independence 
of judgment that underlies important pillars of a lawyer’s professional 
obligations in ways that rob the attorney of his ability to function in the 
professional manner envisioned by governing ethical standards and 
directives. Although this debate continues, and likely will for years to 
come, it is now time to do what is practical and declare a victor.2 Lawyers, 
 * Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The author benefitted greatly from the 
suggestions of Professors Deborah A. DeMott, Kathleen Clark, Harvey J. Goldschmid and Robert W. 
Hillman as well as the comments received in connection with a workshop at Duke Law School and the 
participants in the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Conference held at Washington 
University. Excellent research assistance in preparing this Article was provided by Carl C. Carl, Peter 
D. Christofferson and Ana Henriquez.  
 1.  When explaining what a profession is, Roscoe Pound was less earthy in his reference. He 
states that an organized profession is not “the same sort of things as a retail grocers’ association.” See 
R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 7 (1953).  
 2. There is another reason to declare a victor. With so much already having been written on this 
topic, it is now impossible for commentators to offer a fresh insight. The author’s own review of the 
material impressed upon him the frequency that old wine was refilling old empties.  
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in large numbers, are serving on their clients’ boards and, in an 
increasingly competitive environment, one should expect their pace in 
doing so will increase.3 It is over and it is time to move on and consider 
the consequences of such dual service. 
This Article assumes that dual service will continue to be a practice, 
but not because it is the socially optimal result. Rather, dual service will 
continue to exist because it is, and has been, sufficiently pervasive to 
provide cause to believe no jarring change, such as proscription by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) or state bar organization, is even likely 
to occur. This Article provides a new perspective on the topic by 
examining the junction of a lawyer serving on his client’s board and well-
accepted corporate and securities principles. While this inquiry should 
strike many as natural, the conclusions reached within this Article are 
paradoxical. As examined below, dual service has the effect of increasing 
the protection accorded the beneficiaries of the examined corporate and 
securities law principles. The paradox lies in the fact that the invitation to 
serve comes from a firm’s managers and the examined principles are those 
crafted with a special objective of protecting shareholders and investors, 
even the corporation, from misconduct by the managers. As 
demonostrated in this Article, dual service results in managers being 
subject to greater scrutiny and lawyers to a loss of some of the client’s 
business. Further, dual service even makes it possible for a competing 
lawyer to get his foot into the client’s door, a result that an attorney who 
agrees to serve on his client’s board certainly does not seek. Hence, why 
the invitation? And why the acceptance of the offer to serve on the client’s 
board? 
I. THE OPACITY OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
Just as results are not clear within many areas of law, so it is with the 
guidance one acquires from professional directives bearing on a lawyer’s 
service on the client’s board. But of course, if the rules were clear, there 
would be much less to debate. The touchstone of the debate is rule 1.7 of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a provision adopted in an 
 3. The inertia accompanying the current practice is reflected in the American Bar Association 
not heeding the advice of its task force that recommended dual service by the attorney should be 
discouraged. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, THE LAWYER-DIRECTOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INDEPENDENCE: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE INDEPENDENT LAWYER 63-64 (1998) (not 
calling for a blanket prohibition of dual service). This report prompted instead an even milder response 
than that recommended by its task force. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 98-410 (1998), discussed infra in text following note 14. 
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overwhelming number of states. The comment to the rule addresses 
directly, but simply, the attorney’s service on her client’s board: “If there 
is a material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer’s 
independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a 
director.”4 A similar lack of specificity is found in the recent American 
Law Institute’s treatment of a lawyer’s ethical obligations, which forbids 
lawyers from representing a client when “there is a substantial risk that the 
lawyer’s representation . . . would be materially and adversely affected by 
the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to . . . a third party.”5 
Assessing “risk,” and the parameters of such an assessment, are 
problematic and the fount of the debate that has surrounded attorneys’ 
service on a client’s board.6 However, this assessment is not made easier 
by the multi-headed nature of the lawyer’s corporate client.  
Ambiguity in the risk assessment facing the lawyer-director is 
exacerbated by Model Rule (of Profession Conduct) 1.13, which provides: 
“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the 
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”7 Corporate 
law professors revel in teasing out of their students just who is the 
“corporation” and especially within the context of transactions that pit 
managers against owners, as regularly occurs in shareholder proposals, 
defending control, and going private transactions. Thus, on a given issue, 
there might not be any risk of conflict of interest vis-a-vis the board of 
directors, but could one exist with the shareholders?8 Furthermore, what if 
the prevailing norm is a more communitarian view of the corporation that 
includes labor, suppliers, and the communities where the corporate offices 
are located? Who, then, is the corporation? 
Obviously, the attorney is required to assess potential conflict of 
interests in a wide range of areas, many being as problematic as that posed 
 4. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.17 cmt. n.14 (1999). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (1998). 
 6. There is no disagreement, however, that the lawyer-director should abstain from voting when 
the board considers the question of legal fees or other issues which implicate the lawyer-director’s law 
firm. See, e.g., Robert P. Cummins & Megyn M. Kelly, The Conflicting Roles of Lawyer as Director, 
23 LITIG. 48 (1996); JOHN F. X. PELOSO & IRWIN H. WARREN, THE LAWYER-DIRECTOR: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. TASK FORCE REP. ON THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF LAWYERS 14. But this is the only issue where the commentators agree the 
attorney’s independence to the client is so compromised. 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.13(a) (1999). The Restatement similarly identifies 
the client as the organization that interacts with the lawyer through its “responsible agents.” See 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 96(1)(a) (1998). 
 8. For an excellent overview of the problems created by the embrace of the entity as the client 
of rule 1.13, see Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence 
in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 190-99 (2001). 
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by serving on the client’s board. Hence, arguing that, because lawyers 
acting as corporate counsel must even grapple with possible conflicts of 
interest on other matters—even when not a director—having the additional 
capacity of director is simply a change in scale in addressing her 
independence.9 Indeed, due to the pervasiveness of the obligation to be 
watchful of conflicts that compromise the lawyer’s autonomy, some 
conclude that the lawyer is especially well equipped to handle the ethical 
issues that she will face as a consequence of serving on the client’s 
board.10 Placing the matter in context, there is the broader issue of how 
independent the lawyer is, whether or not she serves on the client’s board, 
when her firm receives significant fees from the corporate client.11 Critics 
of dual service invoke something of a “piling on” argument, emphasizing 
that dual service further erodes the lawyer’s ability to dispassionately 
assess the risks of a serious conflict between her interest and the interests 
of the client.12 
Today, the template for the attorney considering whether to serve on 
his client’s board is not Model Rule 1.13, but the somewhat more finite 
flashing amber light of ABA Formal Opinion 98-410.13 Following the call 
of an ABA Task Force that the ABA should in most cases discourage the 
attorney serving on the client’s board,14 the ABA Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility took a less dramatic step in its Formal Opinion 
98-410. The Formal Opinion sets forth extensive cautionary warnings and 
guidelines attorneys should follow in agreeing to serve on their client’s 
board. Among the points attorneys should raise with their clients before 
agreeing to serve in a dual capacity is (1) that the responsibilities as a 
lawyer will differ from those of being a director; (2) that conflicts may 
arise from time to time that require the lawyer to either cease representing 
the client or resign the directorship; (3) that dual service poses a risk to the 
 9. See, e.g., Patrick W. Straub, ABA Task Force Misses the Mark: Attorneys Should Not Be 
Discouraged from Serving on Their Corporate Clients’ Board of Directors, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 261, 
274-75 (2000); Micalyn S. Harris & Karen L. Valihura, Outside Counsel as Director: The Pros and 
Potential Pitfalls of Dual Service, 53 BUS. LAW. 479, 482-83 (1998). 
 10. Harris & Valihura, supra note 9, at 491. 
 11. See Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 413, 
424 (1996); Robert H. Mundheim, Code of Professional Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of 
Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel, 33 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1514 (1978) (discussion by 
participants and panel comments of Kenneth Bialkin). 
 12. See, e.g., Bernard S. Carrey, Corporate Lawyer/Corporate Director: A Compromise of 
Professional Independence, 67 N.Y. ST. B. J. 6, 7 (Nov. 1995) (cautioning further that “the potential 
for conflict and compromise is always present, and unfortunately too often realized in hindsight”). 
 13. Reported in Formal and Informal Ethics Opinons 1983-1998, at 478. 
 14. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, THE LAWYER-DIRECTOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE INDEPENDENT LAWYER 63-64 (1998). 
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attorney-client privilege; (4) that there may be a necessity to withdraw as a 
director from any matter related to the lawyer’s or his firm’s relationship 
to the company; (5) that the attorney’s position of director must not 
compromise the rendering to the client of advice and judgments regarding 
legal matters; (6) that the attorney will dutifully carry out a matter even if 
the lawyer did not support the decision as a director; and (7) that the 
attorney will not serve as the company’s lawyer when the duties of being a 
director conflict with the professional obligations of acting as the 
company’s lawyer.15 
Although Formal Opinion 98-410 may be seen as providing important 
cautionary warnings to the client, the mandated warnings are likely to be 
heavily discounted by the client who views the very generalized events 
alluded to in each of the preceeding warnings as unlikely to occur.16 More 
importantly, the Formal Opinion provides a ready template for the attorney 
to enter into the dual relationship with the corporate client, but it provides 
no additional specificity regarding the conflicts that will cause the attorney 
to withdraw from either serving as the company’s director or its lawyer. 
As such, Formal Opinion 98-410 exacerbates the opacity problems that 
already existed under the professional standards because it offers an 
encouraging signal for the attorney who, once having given the 
professional Miranda warnings to the client, may charge forward into a 
relationship where conflicts are omnipresent. Although Formal Opinion 
98-410 provides such encouragement, it does nothing to clarify the 
ambiguity of what constitutes a conflict or what is the appropriate 
response to a conflict of the director-lawyers’ roles.  
 15. The Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics of the ABA Section of Business Law, The 
Lawyer as Director of a Client, 57 BUS. LAW. 387. 393-96 (2001) (providing guidelines the lawyer 
should follow to work through the question of serving on the client’s board). 
 16. We may well wonder whether lawyers tend to over-emphasize or under-emphasize the 
presence of a conflict of interest. Although lawyers generally tend to overstate downside risks when 
advising a client, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: 
Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997), is this tendency 
moderated when the lawyer assumes a dual role as director and lawyer? Furthermore, if the conflict is 
to be addressed by directing the client to seek the services of another lawyer, is it less likely that the 
lawyer’s tendency to overstate risks will continue unabated? Here, we might well wonder whether both 
the client and the lawyer will not blunder ahead, being both overconfident in their respective abilities 
to both identify and appropriately address the conflicts that may arise in the future. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market 
Investors and Cause Other Social Harms, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
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II. TWO VIEWS OF THE CLIENT’S ATTORNEY AS DIRECTOR 
In the face of the great uncertainty regarding when dual service 
compromises the attorney-client privilege and what constitutes such a 
conflict as to requires a lawyer to withdraw as either the company’s 
counsel or director, one may legitimately question why either the attorney 
or his client would opt for dual service. Certainly, those who advocate a 
prohibition of the attorney serving on the client’s board see the prohibition 
as a necessary prophylaxis to avoid otherwise problematic judgments by 
the attorney.  
Proponents of dual service argue that the attorney’s service as a 
director enhances the efficiency of an arrangement beneficial to both the 
lawyer and the company. Such proponents see a prohibition as removing 
from the boardroom a category of individuals who “are among the best 
kind of directors a company should have.”17 The lawyer’s perspective is 
both unique and valuable because the lawyer may have knowledge on 
certain matters, such as litigation or regulatory issues that other directors 
lack.18 Dual service enables the lawyer to acquire greater familiarity with 
the client’s business, which translates to his law firm providing more 
effective representation.19 Many companies do not anticipate the need for 
their attorney to be at all meetings of directors. Thus, board membership 
assures an attorney’s perspective at all meetings. And, of course, there are 
more meretricious considerations, such as the inevitable prestige factor for 
the attorney serving on a successful company’s board as well as the fact 
that such service, euphemistically, “solidifies” the firm’s relationship with 
the client.20  
 17. See Mundheim, supra note 11, at 1516 (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin). As stated more 
bluntly: “Some of the best of us are not only damn good lawyers, but damn good businessmen; and to 
deprive the business community of the opportunity to use those poeple’s services in both roles . . . 
would be a terrible mistake.” Id. at 1515, 1516 (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin). 
 18. See Harold M. Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer’s Role, 34 BUS. LAW. 7, 
10 (1978). Another benefit here is that getting the lawyer involved in the initial decision making is 
more likely to occur if the lawyer is also a director; if not so involved, the lawyer may learn of a 
problem only after it has occurred, thereby posing a great challenge in serving the client’s interest. See 
Robert H. Mundheim, supra note 11, at 1508. 
 19. See JAMES H. CHEEK, III & HOWARD H. LAMAR, III, LAWYERS AS DIRECTORS OF CLIENTS: 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, POTENTIAL LIABILITY AND OTHER PITFALLS (PLI Corp. Law & Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. B4-6940, 1990), available at Westlaw, 712 PLI/Corp. 461. For a 
discussion of the non-pecuniary rewards of serving on boards of directors, see James D. Cox & Harry 
L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of 
Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 83, 91-99 (1985). 
 20. See Robert P. Cummins & Megyn M. Kelly, The Conflicting Roles of Lawyers as Directors, 
23 LITIG. 48 (1996). 
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To be sure, the lawyer’s perspective can be provided without dual 
service by assuring his attendance at all meetings of the directors.21 
Furthermore, the company can always appoint to its board lawyers who 
have no professional relationship with the company.22 However, the latter 
scenario poses a Catch-22. If the profession places a bar to a lawyer 
serving on her client’s board, a lawyer would be reluctant to accept 
appointment to a company’s board because such service translates to the 
inability to secure legal business with the company.23 
Another benefit of dual service is the prevalent view that the board 
accords greater weight to the lawyer’s input when it understands that the 
lawyer is a board equal and not merely an advisor.24 Thus, the presence of 
the lawyer as a director enhances the lawyer’s voice as lawyer. To this 
argument, the opponents of dual service warn that the conflicts are 
numerous and often only recognized when their consequences are felt, 
which can be too late for the client.25 As Dean Robert Mundheim has 
observed, the lawyer-director’s advice faces at least two compromising 
dimensions when a conflict of interest arises.26 First, how does the conflict 
impact the lawyer’s own advice or judgment shared with her fellow 
directors?27 Second, with the lawyer candidly explaining her conflict of 
interest, what impact does that disclosure itself have on the clear and 
efficient judgments of the lawyer’s fellow directors?28 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE  
The contemporary view of corporate governance prescribes a divide 
between doers and watchers. This distinction arises from the view that the 
 21. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7.5 at 740 (1986). 
 22. See Mundheim, supra note 11, at 1516 (discussion by participants and panel remarks of 
Lloyd N. Cutler). 
 23. See Mundheim, supra note 11, at 1510. But, of course, lawyers may well take a longer view 
and an absolute bar would invite them to do so. The lawyer barred from a professional relationship 
with a corporation on whose board he serves may see board service as getting something of the 
professional shoe in the client’s door. Once establishing a rapport and warm relationship with the CEO 
and others within the corporation, the lawyer’s resignation could be timed to coincide with the award 
of some of the company’s legal business. Such a prospect would also be seen by the company’s 
present outside counsel, which could make for an interesting dynamic within and without the 
boardroom. 
 24. See Harris & Valihura, supra note 9, at 483. See also Mundheim, supra note 11, at 1514 (“A 
lawyer, merely invited as a guest and limited to legal advice when requested, would not have the 
franchise to speak or raise the questions which should be raised . . . .”) (remarks of Ken Bialkin). 
 25. See Carrey, supra note 12, at 7. See generally Albert, supra note 11, at 431. 
 26. See Mundheim, supra note 11, at 1509. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
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board should include a critical mass of independent directors whose 
function is not the development or even review of business policy but the 
evaluation of senior management’s stewardship of the firm.29 The 
prevalence today of the outside board or, more generally, the rise of the 
independent director is tangible evidence of the vitality of the monitoring 
model. The monitoring model first served as a means to evaluate 
management’s stewardship. Its critical contributions were the board 
rewarding or removing senior officers and providing important insulation 
between the officers and the firm’s auditors. However, the model has 
become the most significant force in shaping the law’s development in 
such diverse areas as derivative suit litigation, takeover defenses, and the 
treatment of minority stockholders. For example, the special litigation 
committee arms the corporation with a means not only for an outside 
director to clean the corporation’s stable, but to provide it with a voice 
with regard to the question whether a derivative suit serves the best 
interests of the corporation.30 And, when the wagons are circled in 
response to a hostile bid to takeover the firm, courts regularly give great 
weight to the judgment of the independent directors who deliberate and 
bless certain defensive measures.31 Doctrine also accords outside directors 
a pivotal role in protecting minority stockholders from managerial or 
majority oppression. The presence of a committee of independent directors 
who, for example, negotiate and/or approve the terms of an acquisition 
between the corporation and its controlling stockholders is the surest route 
to resurrect the presumptions of fairness for what otherwise is clearly a 
self-dealing transaction that might fail to meet the inherent fairness 
standards.32 In contrast to these episodic insertions of the outside director 
 29. This view is best stated in MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: 
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 141-48 (1976), and is the cornerstone of the American Law Institute’s Corporate 
Governance Project. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.01-3.05 (1992). 
 30. See generally James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit 
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959. 
 31. The source of this weight is the leading case on the topic, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), wherein the independent directors met separately with their attorneys and 
financial advisors to consider what response, if any, to make a hostile tender offer. Absent evidence of 
such independence subjects the defensive maneuvers to extremely close scrutiny with the likely effect 
they will be struck down. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. McMillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 
1988). 
 32. See Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 498-500 (Del. Ch. 1990) 
(presence of independent committee restores presumptions of fairness); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 
493 A.2d 929, 937-38 (Del. 1985) (same). For a case in which the committee was so compromised as 
not to shift the burden of proving intrinsic fairness from the controlling stockholder, see Kahn v. 
Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/3
p541 Cox book pages.doc12/19/2002   4:23 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] PARADOXICAL ATTORNEY-DIRECTOR RELATIONSHIP 549 
 
 
 
 
 
in corporate doctrine are the more systematic structural efforts that rely on 
the independent director. Examples of such structural embraces are 
standing committees that are heavily populated, sometimes exclusively, by 
outside directors, such as the compensation, nominating,33 and audit 
committees.34  
As illustrated above, a cornerstone of so much of corporate law today 
is the monitoring model, and more specifically, the outside director. The 
role for such directors is not defined as much by what the director knows 
as by the individual director’s independence from management. The 
general fiduciary obligation of directors that they be reasonably informed 
with respect to any matter coming before them and, more generally, 
should adequately inform themselves on the conduct of the corporation’s 
business fits somewhat poorly the outside director. One cannot easily 
come from outside—where she has extensive obligations—and be able to 
have an acute understanding of the internal workings of the firm or even 
its performance. The imbalance between, on the one hand, the fiduciary 
demands of directors and, on the other hand, the position of the outside 
director are addressed by the broad recognition, frequently even embodied 
in statutes, that directors may satisfy their duty to be reasonably informed 
by relying on the reports, opinions, and data prepared by others. The 
position set forth in the ABA Model Business Corporation Act is reflective 
of both the practical necessity and the board’s authority to rely upon others 
in meeting the directors’ duty to be reasonably informed: 
In discharging board or committee duties, a director, who does not 
have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely 
on information, opinions, reports or statements . . . prepared or 
presented by . . . legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons 
retained by the corporation as to matters involving skills or 
expertise the director reasonably believes are matters (i) within the 
particular person’s professional or expert competence or (ii) as to 
which the particular person merits confidence . . . .35 
Approaches, such as that taken by the Model Act, may well be seen as 
purely enabling and not prescriptive of what directors should do. 
However, the above-quoted provision takes on a prescriptive quality when 
 33. See, e.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 34. See generally Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committee, Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1067 (1999). 
 35. A.B.A. Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30(d)(e)(2) (1998). 
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read against the general standards for director liability that envision 
liability when directors do not discharge their obligation to be reasonably 
informed and, more to the point of the attorney as director question, 
recognizes liability when it is established a director acted with: 
[A] lack of objectivity due to the director’s familial, financial or 
business relationship with . . . another person having a material 
interest in the challenged conduct (A) which relationship . . . could 
reasonably be expected to have affected the director’s judgment 
respecting the challenged conduct in a manner adverse to the 
corporation, and (B) after a reasonable expectation to such effect 
has been established, the director shall not have established that the 
challenged conduct was reasonably believed by the director to be in 
the best interests of the corporation . . . .36 
The most straightforward implications of the preceeding provision is 
that there are a range of issues in which the attorney as director will 
minimally have the burden of proving her vote was not corrupted by fear 
that to have voted otherwise would jeopardize the pecuniary relationship 
the attorney had with the corporation. Simply stated, there exists good 
cause to doubt that the attorney-director does not enjoy the same business 
judgment rule presumption of propriety when approving a transaction that 
involves a conflict of interest on the part of senior officers. To be sure, the 
attorney-director has the benefit of the few cases that have considered 
whether he is “interested” in the transaction before the board so he cannot 
be included among those deemed independent for the purposes of 
approving a self-dealing transaction involving senior management. The 
cases have consistently held that a director does not cease being 
independent solely because his firm enjoys substantial legal fees from the 
corporation.37 Nevertheless, the case law is far from definitive. First, the 
suits finding that the attorney-director is independent arise primarily in 
disputes involving the securities law antifraud provision. In such cases, the 
issue is whether the corporation’s decision to purchase or sell shares was 
carried out by an independent decision maker. In such a question, 
dominance or control of the decision-making process is the focus. In 
contrast, the governance issue that arises when independent directors are 
called upon to assess a conflict of interest transaction focuses upon the 
reasonableness of their actions.38 In this case, the guidance from 
 36. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(A)(B). 
 37. The leading case is Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 
 38. For an analogous appoach, consider the actions of the SEC in amending the rules for the 
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provisions, such as the earlier-quoted excerpt from the Model Business 
Corporations Act, should call for a different focus regarding the 
independence of those advising the independent directors. Nevertheless, 
cases holding that the firm’s counsel can be an independent director can as 
easily be read as also holding that other directors may continue to enjoy 
the protection of the state’s business judgment rule when they rely upon 
the advice, report, or opinion of the firm’s outside counsel who has a 
significant financial relationship with the firm. 
However, one has reason to believe that the criteria that we apply in 
determining whether the attorney-director is to be viewed as an 
independent director is quite different from that of whether her fellow 
directors may justifiably rely upon the attorney-director in considering a 
conflict of interest transaction involving senior management. In such 
situations, courts have fairly consistently required that the attorney 
advising the subgroup of the board not be the same firm that customarily 
advises senior management. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent 
with the aspirational requirement that reliance upon counsel is not 
permitted when the director has “knowledge that makes reliance 
unwarranted.” An example is Stepak v. Addison,39 an outside law firm that 
had served for many year’s as the company’s counsel represented the 
individual officers in criminal proceedings and subsequently advised the 
outside directors in their consideration of a demand made upon the board 
that it initiate suit against the officers. The court held the directors’ 
reliance upon counsel was outside the ambit of an informed business 
judgment. Stepak is consistent with the common practice among 
committee’s impaneled to mediate or approve transactions pitting 
management, and/or its controlling stockholder against the corporation 
and/or its minority holders to retain advisors, legal and non-legal, who 
have no prior relationship with the corporation.40 
Investment Company act to condition future exemptions from regulatory provisions designed to 
protect the fund’s shareholders from actions of its managers upon, among other factors, the approval of 
independent directors who are advised by counsel that is independent from the fund’s advisors. See 
Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Rel. No. 33-7932 (Feb. 5, 
2001). 
 39. 20 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 
 40. The independence of council is a significant consideration in weighing the independence of a 
board committee charged with the responsibility of assessing whether the corporation’s interest in 
derivative suit questioning a transaction by its managers. See Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 93 
(Wis. 2000); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1048 (Pa. 1997). See also Cutshall v. Barker, 733 
N.E.2d 973, 980-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (New counsel retained after initiation of derivative suit can 
represent the corporation and the committee without impugning the committee’s independence.); 
Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (absence of relationship with the 
defendants by the committee’s attorney weighed positively in assessing committee’s independence). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p541 Cox book pages.doc12/19/2002   4:23 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
552 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:541 
 
 
 
 
 
The more difficult part of divining what implications to draw from the 
conflict of interest implications of the above-quoted provisions is what 
actually changes if the attorney, whose advice may be conflicted because 
of an important monetary relationship with the corporation through his ties 
with management, also serves on the client’s board. The easy answer is 
that it is the attorney’s professional, not directorial, relationship that is 
material in determining whether the attorney-director’s board colleagues 
may justifiably rely on her advice. This response, however, ignores the 
important practical and perceptional dimensions of a conflict of interest.  
To illustrate the problem, consider the following hypothetical. Z 
Company is engaged in the energy business and on December 20, Z will 
announce a self tender for its shares, offering $5 above the share’s current 
$20 market price. Before the self tender is announced, Z’s board approves 
accelerating the exercise date of managements stock options, so they can 
be exercised on December 18 rather than later in the new year as presently 
provided. The result is that Z’s senior managers, who are aware of the 
forthcoming self tender, are likely to exercise their options before the 
shares rise to $25 upon announcement of the self tender. By Z’s board 
resolving to accelerate the exercise date, the senior officers enjoy a 
substantial tax savings and the corporation loses a deduction equal to the 
applicable tax rate multiplied by the number of shares acquired through 
the options multiplied by $5. Assume further that Z’s board, when making 
its decision, was advised by outside counsel who did not inform the board 
that a consequence of their decision the corporation would forego a large 
tax deduction. Is Z’s board’s reliance on counsel any the less justified if 
that counsel is also a director of the corporation? 
The astute observer of corporate law will note that the above 
hypothetical is only barely fictional; the facts reflect those in the landmark 
decision, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.41 In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme 
Court set forth the substantive review procedures to be followed in 
response to a recommendation of a special litigation committee that a 
derivative suit be dismissed. Zapata did not address the question posed 
Thus, a special litigation committee’s recommendation was viewed as flawed because it failed to be 
advised by counsel that was independent of the managers who were the subject of the committee’s 
review. See In re Pharm, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); cf. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 
1184, 1190 (Del. 1985) (in-house counsel who merely scheduled interviews not fatal to the 
committee’s independence). 
 41. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Judicial review of special litigation committee recommendations 
is a highly nuanced subject—even within Delaware. For a review of the various approaches and issues 
faced within each approach, see JAMES D. COX ET AL. 2 CORPORATIONS § 15.8 (1st ed. 1995) 
(annually supplemented). 
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above: Is the board’s reliance on counsel permitted when counsel is also a 
director? To address this question, consider the result if the directors did 
not rely on outside counsel, but instead relied on a report of one of the 
officers (its general counsel) who was known to be covered by the options 
and who ultimately benefitted by the exercise date being accelerated. This 
should strike most as a situation in which “reliance is unwarranted” 
because reliance is being placed upon an individual with a material 
financial interest in the transaction. Even if the general counsel was not 
covered by the option, his opining on matters, which could so directly 
affect the fisc of his superior, is cause for viewing the directors’ reliance as 
unwarranted.42 The control over the future career of the general counsel by 
those who benefit from the acceleration of the exercise date demands the 
directors to be advised by independent counsel.  
The final scenario assumes that no officer serves on the board, that 
outside counsel serves on the board, and that the outside counsel joins four 
outside directors in voting in favor of accelerating the options’ exercise 
date. Because there is approval by a majority of the outside directors, even 
after discarding the vote of attorney-director, it could be concluded that the 
presumptions of the business judgment rule applies. However, to so 
conclude appears to overlook the clear significance of the requirement that 
reliance on counsel is permissable provided the director “does not have 
knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted.” Accepting the guidance 
from the securities law cases holding that substantial legal fees alone do 
not render the attorney-director interested in a transaction, it is logical to 
believe that in order for the director to enjoy the benefits of such reliance, 
that individual must have the freedom to consider whether more than the 
size of the legal fees may compromise the attorney’s judgment. For 
example, there exists a question of whether the legal fees are significant to 
that attorney’s firm or that attorney’s position in the firm. Moreover, there 
is every reason to believe that the threshold showing required to render 
reliance unwarranted is not the same as that which frustrates one’s 
independence within the context of the state conflict of interest statute. 
Recall that state conflict of interest statutes carefully define the type of 
interest—direct or indirect—that defines who is independent for the 
purpose of reviewing and approving a conflict of interest transaction. The 
 42. Those who are under the control of the party engaged in a self-dealing transaction are not 
seen as indendent. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (committee of “outside” 
directors empaneled to approve fairness of merger lacked independence because its members prior and 
on-going affiliations with companies controlled by the defendant and they received substantial 
compensation through such affiliations). 
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statutes also condition such approval being by the independent directors 
acting in “good faith.” This good faith requirement, unless it is to be 
rendered superfluous, transcends the narrower definition of director or 
indirect conflict of interest. As such, a relationship may not be of the type 
that falls within the scope of the type of transaction regulated by a conflict 
of interest statute, although it still may raise questions regarding one’s 
good faith. It is just such a matter that the approving body should explore 
if it is to enjoy the benefits of the not having “knowledge that makes 
reliance unwarranted.” This reasoning may, at first blush, however, appear 
to prove too much. If directors in the position to approve a self-dealing 
transaction must be skeptical of the advice they are receiving from the 
attorney-director, then they should likely be skeptical in all cases. After 
all, the complaint is that the source of our concern for the advice given is 
not due to the relationship of the attorney as director, but because of the 
attorney as attorney for the firm. That is, the infecting relationship is 
always present with outside counsel; we start with a very substantial 
conflict of interest (when the attorney is opining on a matter related to the 
senior executive’s dealings with the corporation) and add to it, perhaps 
only at the margins, when we make the advising attorney a director. 
Hence, the conflict does not arise upon the attorney’s appointment to the 
board. It already existed. Viewed in such a manner, any broad conclusion 
of directors who are not able to rely on counsel when counsel is a director 
must apply when the counsel is not also a director.43 So, what separates the 
two situations? Is it only that the conflict is drawn more boldly when 
counsel sits as a director? 
More than mere perception is at issue here. In such conflict of interest 
matters, the true divide is the ability of the non-conflicted directors to 
deliberate among themselves. Their internal deliberations can lead to many 
possible courses of action; one course could be to ponder the advice of 
counsel and perhaps question whether further external advice is necessary. 
When counsel is part of the deliberative process, the course of action 
directors may pursue is more circumscribed than when the directors 
cordially ask the advising counsel to wait in the hallway. The difference is 
neither subtle nor trivial. The requirement that counsel “does not have 
knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted” invites open and independent 
deliberations among the directors whether they should so rely. This 
 43. For the view that, because management—and more particularly the chief executive officer—
retains outside counsel, such counsel when serving as a director should be considered an inside 
director in a similar manner as the CFO or other subordinate would be treated, see Williams, supra 
note 18, at 11. 
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decision-making cannot, as a practical matter, occur when the attorney-
director is a participant in the deliberations. In the attorney-director 
setting, the outside directors could ask the attorney to recuse herself. 
Although this makes the directors’ deliberations appear more independent, 
it also makes those who remain in the room look more like outside director 
committees in other contexts so that the analogy may well carry forward to 
demand that they too obtain fully disinterested counsel. Moreover, a 
decision to ask the attorney-director to recuse herself erodes the 
reasonableness of the remaining directors to rely upon the attorney as their 
attorney. Just what are the parameters for their considering whether it is 
appropriate to continue to rely on counsel to advise them on the same 
matter that they once doubted the independence of the advice counsel 
would provide on a conflict of interest transaction involving senior 
management? 
Thus, the dual service by the company’s attorney can be seen as 
expanding the instances in which board committees must be impaneled to 
address conflict of interest transactions. In a sense, such stratification of 
the board is natural, regardless of there being dual service, because the 
common approach for conflict of interest transactions is to focus upon the 
approval by the disinterested directors. However, as seen above, with dual 
service, the segregation of directors does not occur along the lines of those 
who have a direct financial interest in the transaction and those that do not. 
Instead, the divide is with those who appear to be financially linked to the 
transaction or financially dependent upon management. This seperation 
moves the transaction and the process toward, if not to, the presently 
recognized instances in which a subcommittee of the board addresses 
special conflict of interest problems, such as takeover defenses, where the 
conflicts of interest are indirect, not direct. As addressed supra, in those 
instances, courts have grown accustomed to the independent directors 
being advised by their own counsel and other advisors. That is, 
independence in the subcommittee context implicates not just the 
individual director’s status, but also the information that the independent 
director receives in the decision-making process. Thus, the paradox for the 
attorney-director who serves on his client’s board is that such service 
likely expands the instances in which a competing law firm gets its foot in 
the boardroom door. This is hardly the desire or the goal of the attorney in 
deciding to undertake such service. Moreover, the managers who invite the 
attorney to join the board will find that dual service expands the instances 
when their conduct will be assessed by a independent board committee 
that is advised by counsel unfamiliar to management. 
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IV. DUAL SERVICE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 
The disclosure requirements of U.S. securities laws appear on many 
fronts, including those the issuer must make in connection with the public 
or private placement of its securities, the periodic reporting of information 
required for public companies, proxy solicitations, takeover requirements, 
disclosures needed to update and correct earlier releases of information, 
and the more pervasive need for public announcements not to commit half 
truths. The linchpin for assuring a company’s compliance with the 
securities laws is the attorney. Regularly, it is the attorney, most likely 
outside counsel, whose expertise in the nuanced and arcane requirements 
of the securities laws enables her to advise the client on when disclosure 
must occur as well as what must be disclosed. Because of their central 
role, lawyers are correctly seen as among the gatekeepers for the integrity 
of the disclosure requirements of securities laws. Although lawyers do not 
provide the same certification function as do accountants, and lawyers’ 
reputations are not nearly as important as those of underwriters 
distributing the issuer’s securities,44 the lawyers’ expertise in interpreting 
the demands of the securities laws naturally thrusts them to the forefront to 
guide the client through the regulatory thicket. 
Among the most significant developments within the securities laws 
are the professional requirements for lawyers advising clients on securities 
law issues. These developments occurred not around state or ABA 
standards, but through interpretations of the disclosure demands of the 
securities laws. At one level, all lawyers fear their reputations will be 
harmed should they assist their clients in engaging in an act later deemed 
to constitute a securities violation. That fear takes on a special significance 
when more than the lawyer’s reputation is at risk for participating in the 
client’s violation. Lawyers can be aiders and abettors of their clients’ 
violations, and are sometimes even included among the primary 
participants of a securities violation. The focus here is not to review these 
developments that expose the lawyer qua lawyer to responsibility under 
the securities laws, but to examine closely how the role of lawyer as 
gatekeeper is affected by also serving on the client’s board of directors.  
 44. See generally Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15 
(1995). 
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A. Heightened Diligence for Registered Public Offerings 
The gatekeeper designation is most apparent in Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, which is the most specific of all the securities law 
liability provisions in identifying those who can be held financially 
responsible. Section 11 conscripts to the gatekeeper role senior 
management, the issuer’s directors, all the underwriters, and those who 
provide an express certification function, such as accountants. It assigns to 
each such designated person liability for a material misrepresentation in 
the registration statement unless the person establishes compliance with 
section 11’s demanding due diligence requirements, namely that the 
designated person “had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground 
to believe and did believe” the registration statement was not materially 
misleading.45 The quarterbacks for the registration statement, the issuer’s 
attorney and the underwriter’s counsel, are both noticeably lacking from 
this exclusive list of possible defendants. These two attorneys customarily 
have a significant involvement in the preparation and review of the 
registration statement. Moreover, attorneys are not swept into section 11 
liability through the Act’s control person provision.46  
In contrast to the attorney qua attorney who escapes statutory 
responsibilities under section 11, the attorney who also serves on the 
client’s board has significant exposure to liability under section 11. The 
most dramatic illustration of this is Feit v. Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corp.,47 where the court held that Leasco’s registration 
statement covering securities to be issued in its acquisition of Reliance 
Insurance Company was materially misleading in failing to disclose that as 
a result of the acquisition Leasco would gain control of approximately 
$100 million in assets (the “surplus surplus”) that was not necessary for 
operating Reliance’s insurance business.48 Among Leasco’s directors was 
Hodes, an attorney with the law firm that represented Leasco.  
As the court in Feit describes: 
Hodes [had] been a director . . . three years or more at the time of 
this registration statement. He participated extensively in the 
 45. Securities Act § 11(B)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
 46. Liability of controlling persons for Section 11 violations can arise under Section 15 of the 
Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2000). One’s ability to persuade and counsel does not render one a 
control person. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986). 
However, the director who is the general counsel and reviewed most corporate disclosures fits the 
control person designation. See Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396-97 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 47. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 
 48. Id. at 550-51, 572-74. 
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discussions leading up to the exchange offer for Reliance shares . . . 
and was constantly involved in the deal throughout both the 
preliminary and execution stages of the transaction. He, or a 
representative of his law firm, attended all meetings and was 
consulted on all matters pertaining to the acquisition. He was 
directly responsible for preparation of the registration statement and 
initiated all the research regarding reorganization of Reliance and 
separation of its surplus surplus.49  
Because of Hodes’ deep involvement with the issuer and the 
acquisition, a level one would find unremarkable for outside counsel, the 
court treated him as an “insider.”50 The distinction between inside and 
outside director is not found in the text of section 11, but arises from the 
courts’ interpretation of the due diligence defense wherein what 
constitutes a “reasonable investigation” or “reasonable ground to believe” 
is informed by, among other factors, the individual’s expertise and 
involvement with the issuer. Therefore, in the classic securities law 
decision, Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,51 the attorney-director 
Grant was unable to establish his due diligence defense, grant failed, 
among other matters, first, to review the purported contracts with 
customers that managers falsely represented firm orders, and secondly, to 
review the agreement with the issuer’s factor, which doing so would have 
revealed that the issuer was the guarantor of the total amount of customer 
notes sold to the factor but which the managers represented the issuer was 
only responsible for twenty-five percent.52 The attorney-director, certainly 
if deeply involved in overseeing the preparation of the registration 
statement, has a more substantial burden than other non-management 
directors because he is readily treated as an insider on a scale equal to the 
company’s officers. 
Inside directors with intimate knowledge of corporate affairs and of the 
particular transactions will be expected to make a more complete 
investigation and have more extensive knowledge of facts supporting or 
contradicting inclusions in the registration statements than outside 
directors.53 Indeed, the burden on the attorney-director appears to even 
 49. Id. at 576. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 52. Id. at 689-92. 
 53. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The 
court, in fact, goes even further, to hold that Hodes, like other insiders, as part of their obligation to 
undertake a reasonable investigation had a duty to expend non-trivial efforts in an attempt to learn if 
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exceed that imposed upon the underwriters. In a recent decision, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the underwriter’s motion for 
summary judgment that was based upon the underwriters uncritical 
acceptance of managements’ representations.54 In reversing on this point, 
the panel reasoned that underwriters are under an obligation to play devil’s 
advocate with management’s representation but stopped short in its 
reasoning of requiring, as BarChris and Feit had, that for underwriters to 
satisfy their due diligence obligations they must independently examine 
documents supporting management’s representations.55 On this point, it is 
relevant that the underwriters in Feit were deemed to have established 
their due diligence defense because of their counsel’s reliance upon 
representations by Leasco’s management that was not contradicted by 
other publicly available information available to the underwriters and their 
counsel.56 However, had their counsel also served as a director, the result 
likely would have been different. 
As interpreted by BarChris, Feit, and Software Toolworks, the 
protection afforded investors by section 11 is greatly heightened when the 
issuer’s counsel serves on his client’s board compared to when he does 
not. Absent service on the corporation’s board, the attorney at most is 
faced with liability under the general antifraud provision for which 
liability requires at least reckless behavior on the attorney’s part.57 Even 
this liability does not exist in the circuits that require the misleading 
statement be attributed to the defendant before he can be a primary 
participant.58 Furthermore, the attorney’s direct liability to investors 
Reliance had surplus surplus. Thus, the court’s reasoning is not limited to the narrower basis that 
Hodes must have known there was significant surplus surplus such that he could not meet the 
“reasonable ground to believe” prong of his due diligence defense. Much like Grant in BarChris, the 
court separately concluded he failed to demonstrate he carried out a “reasonable investigation.” Id. at 
580-81. 
 54. In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’g in part and aff’g in part 
789 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 55. See id. at 1088. 
 56. Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 582-83. 
 57. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01 (1976). Regarding the meaning of 
scienter, and particularly the different formulations of recklessness, see JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 730-34 (3d ed. 2001). 
 58. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001) (lawyers who draft, 
edit and review the client’s misleading promotional materials cannot be responsible under section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5 as primary participants unless the investors who relied upon the reports can 
attribute the misleading statements to the attorney); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (same for accountants). Circuits adhering instead to the “substantial participation test reach 
a different result. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 629 (9th Cir. 1994) (invoking 
the substantial participation test, accountants and underwriters are primary participants when they 
draft, review, and edit misleading materials, even though the materials are attributed only to their 
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outside the securities laws is even more doubtful—barring actual 
fraudulent intent.59 However, the attorney as a director is subject to the full 
demands of the due diligence defense. The attorney so invited to serve on 
the corporation’s board can be expected to have an involvement in the 
client’s affairs equal to that of Grant in BarChris or Hodes in Feit. The 
leading commentary on the meaning of BarChris crisply states the section 
11 burdens imposed on the attorney-director: 
In short, assuming that every director’s investigation must meet 
certain qualitative standards, for the attorney-director the higher 
standard stated and applied in BarChris would mean doing many of 
the same things as other directors but doing them in a more 
professional way (as befits a professional man), conducting a more 
extensive and intensive investigation and, most importantly, 
verifying facts.60 
To be sure, the demands placed upon attorney-directors, such as Hodes 
in Feit or Grant in BarChris, may call for no greater skill, care, and 
competence generally expected of professionals providing service to their 
clients. However, one cannot be blind to the fact that the standard for 
diligence and magnitude of liability under section 11 are much greater 
than arise in connection with a professional malpractice claim.61 Thus, 
exposure to section 11 liability by serving on the client’s board will 
enhance the attorney’s commitment to perform at such a professional 
level. Therefore, one has every reason to believe that courts’ treatment of 
the attorney as insiders such as in BarChris and Feit, and the concomitant 
ratchetting up of the meaning of due diligence, will reduce the frequency 
and scale of misleading statements in the registration statements.  
client). 
 59. See infra note 60. 
 60. Ernest L. Folk, III, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 
Part I - Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1969). 
 61. Professor Folk points out that one important area of difference is that the burden of proof is 
on the malpractice claimant to prove nonadherence to professional standards, whereas Section 11 
places the burden on the plaintiff. Id. at 36. More troubling is that ordinary or even gross negligence 
does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of remote users of financial information, and 
recovery on behalf of the corporation may be limited by procedural impediments that accompany 
derivative suits or because the can be laid to the firm’s managers. See, e.g., Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & 
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/3
p541 Cox book pages.doc12/19/2002   4:23 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] PARADOXICAL ATTORNEY-DIRECTOR RELATIONSHIP 561 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Signing Form 10-K 
The securities law implications of an attorney serving on his client’s 
board of directors are much more straightforward in the context of section 
11 responsibilities than they are under the antifraud provision section 
10(b). In most litigation under the antifraud provision, dual service does 
not change the result. However, after the rejection of aiding and abetting 
liability in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,62 
dual service assumes great significance when the misleading statement 
appears in the client’s Form 10-K. In this setting, the significance of the 
attorney’s dual capacity arises from the holding of Central Bank of Denver 
that defendants are responsible only for those misrepresentations they 
“make.”63 Under the liberal “substantial factor” approach, the attorney 
becomes such a primary participant through drafting, editing, and 
reviewing the misleading portions of the document—assuming such 
activities are committed with the requisite scienter.64 However, some 
circuits follow a much more conservative approach. Relying upon the 
reasoning of Central Bank of Denver that aiding and abetting liability, if 
permitted, would also lift the plaintiff’s obligation to prove reliance, these 
courts impose the additional requirement that the misleading statement 
must on its face be attributable to a person before that person can be a 
primary participant.65 Under this approach, the attorney who crafts the 
misleading statement that appears in her client’s reports is not liable under 
the antifraud provision if that report does not expressly attribute the 
statement to the attorney.66 However, when the report is a document filed 
 62. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). On the general scope of primary participant liability after Central Bank 
of Denver, see Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability 
Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1999), and Robert A. Prentice, 
Locating that “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability 
Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997). On the scope of possible approaches for extending 
liability as a primary participant beyond those who transact directly with the defrauded plaintiff, see 
James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
519 (1996). 
 63. Id. at 520. 
 64. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(attorney who in conversations with investors repeats misrepresentations of his clients is a primary 
participant); Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996) (primary 
participant liability sufficiently pleaded by allegations the accountants had drafted, reviewed, and 
edited misleading financial announcement); In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 627, 629 
(9th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 65. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 66. See Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001) (primary participant 
liability requires those who draft, edit, and review the misleading representations be identified). Cf. In 
re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Lit., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (accountant who 
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with the SEC whose rules require the signature of the issuer’s board of 
directors, the requisite attribution is provided. In this case, the attorney 
who also serves on the client’s board and signs the Form 10-K thereby 
loses anonymity and is liable.67 To the extent such a threat of liability 
elicits greater caution on the part of the attorney than underlying 
professional standards, we can conclude dual service results in some 
increase in investor protection.  
C. Professional Obligations Under Rule 102(e) 
A more intriguing dimension of the attorney’s service on the client’s 
board is its dual impact upon the attorney’s obligations pursuant to Rule 
102(e)(ii) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice68 and its impact on the securities 
law obligations of other members of the board. This provision authorizes 
the SEC to undertake disciplinary action against those who “practice” 
before the Commission when, among other forms of misbehavior, the 
person is “found by the Commission” to have engaged in “unethical or 
improper professional conduct.”69 The full effect of this provision is set 
forth in In re Carter.70 
Carter and Johnson were outside attorneys for National Telephone 
Company. On several occasions they had advised National’s CEO, 
Sheldon L. Hart, that National should disclose the full terms of its lending 
agreement with a consortium of banks, which, if triggered (as it ultimately 
was), would require a winding down of National’s business. The facts set 
forth in the SEC enforcement proceeding clearly documented Hart’s total 
disregard of this disclosure advice. The Commissioners in In re Carter 
merely reviews and approves circulation of financial statements is not a primary participant if its name 
is not associated with the false representations therein). 
 67. This is true because SEC Form 10-K is required to be signed by at least a majority of the 
corporation’s directors. See Securities Exchange Act Form 10-K, General Instructions D (2)(a), 
published in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,102, at 22061. Those who sign the report with knowledge 
that it includes a material misrepresentation are deemed to have “made” that representation and, hence, 
are primary participants, even under the heightened attribution standards of Wright. See Howard v. 
Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000); In re JWP, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1239 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2002). 
 69. Id. Refinements purporting to introduce clarity and coherence to this standard as it applies to 
accountants was added by subsection (iv) of rule 102(e) in 1998. See Securities Act Release No. 33-
7593 (Nov. 16, 1998). However, this change did not address similar concerns with respect to other 
professionals, such as lawyers. See Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(e): Securities 
and Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 652 (1991). 
 70. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,150 (Feb. 28, 1981).  
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announced the following as being among the duties of the securities 
lawyer: 
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation 
of a company’s compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a 
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure 
requirements, his continued participation violates professional 
standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client’s 
noncompliance.71 
Initially counselling accurate disclosure is sufficient, even if the advice 
is not accepted. However, there comes a point at which a reasonable 
lawyer must conclude that the client is not following his advice, or perhaps 
his advice was not even sought in good faith, and that the client is 
involved in a continuing course of violating the securities laws. At this 
juncture, the lawyer must take further, more affirmative steps, in order to 
avoid the inference that he has been co-opted, willingly or unwillingly, 
into the scheme of nondisclosure: 
The lawyer is in the best position to choose his next step. 
Resignation is one option . . . . A direct approach to the board of 
directors or one or more individual directors or officers may be 
appropriate; or he may choose to try to enlist the aid of other 
members of the firm’s management. What is required, in short, is 
some prompt action that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is 
engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather than 
having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed, but misguided 
client.72 
Observe that neither Carter nor Johnson served on National’s board, 
and observe further, that the above-described chain of obligations when 
dealing with the obviously uncooperative manager appears to place the 
attorney’s direct resort to the board of directors on the same level as 
resigning. Whatever the next step, the Commission calls for “some prompt 
 71. In re Carter, supra note 70, at 84,172. The recently enacted Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (more generally, Sarbanes-Oxley Act), PL 107-204 (July 
30, 2002), codifies rule 102(e) and calls for the SEC to adopt rules for attorneys practicing before it 
requiring steps similar to those set forth in Carter-Johnson when the attorney learns of a material 
violation of the securities laws. 
 72. Goelzer & Wyderko, supra note 69, at 664-65. Because the Commissioners viewed the 
standard for conduct it believed proper for securities lawyers confronting an uncooperative client, such 
as Hart, was new, it did not discipline either Carter or Johnson. 
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action” on the part of the attorney. Within the Commission’s crisp 
formulation of the securities lawyer’s obligations, several conclusions 
arise from the additional feature of that lawyer serving on his client’s 
board. First, such service makes it more likely that the attorney will be 
aware earlier than if the attorney does not have a dual capacity that the 
manager is ignoring the attorney’s disclosure advice. Indeed, had this 
occurred, Carter and Johnson no doubt would have learned much earlier 
that National’s financial state had reached the point that the draconian 
wind-down provision of the loan agreement had been triggered. This late 
notification necessarily meant that their disclosure advice would have 
occurred even earlier than if they were not board members and had learned 
of the company’s deteriorated financial position. Second, the apparent 
hurdle the Commission envisioned with the attorney bypassing 
management and taking her concern to the board should be lower when the 
attorney is also a director. When the issue is raising a concern regarding 
the company’s disclosures with one’s fellow directors, it is reasonable to 
view direct resort to the board of directors should not be seen as such a 
substantial step as to place it on the same level as resignation of the firm’s 
attorney as the Commission states it to be in the above-quoted formulation 
of the attorney’s obligation. Absent the attorney serving as a director, 
going to the board obviously strains the relationship between the CEO and 
the attorney—a point that indubitably explains why the Commission 
placed this alternative on footing equal to that of resignation. However, the 
conflicting fiduciary obligations of the attorney to inform the fellow 
directors of a matter bearing on managements’ stewardship73 places this 
option at a lower order in terms of its collateral impact than when the 
attorney is not also a director. Thirdly, because the option of reporting the 
attorney’s concerns directly to the board of directors is not an unexpected 
or unauthorized communication, there is every reason to believe that the 
attorney’s resort to the board should occur earlier than would be the case 
when there is no dual service. 
D. Reliance Upon Counsel Defense 
The final dimension of dual service under the antifraud provision 
focuses upon the ability of other directors to rely upon the advice of the 
attorney when the charge is they acted recklessly. The ability of officers 
 73. See, e.g., Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(recognizing obligation of directors to inform fellow directors of conflict of interest on the part of 
investment banking firm advising firm on its acquistion). 
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and directors to rely upon counsel’s advise regarding their disclosure 
obligations is well recognized.74 Although such reliance is not a complete 
defense, but only a factor in considering whether the person relying acted 
with scienter, the presumption of absence of reliance is a high one if all the 
factors of the defense are made out.75 Similar to the approach taken in so 
many areas, inquiries into whether the directors acted with scienter, 
especially whether they acted recklessly in meeting their disclosure 
obligations, is informed by the fiduciary obligations of directors under 
state law. For example, in In re Digi Int’l, Inc. Securities Litigation,76 the 
Eighth Circuit upheld the granting of the outside directors’ motion for 
summary judgment on whether they acted with scienter upon proof they 
relied in good faith upon the advice of counsel. The issue before the court 
was the propriety of recognizing revenue arising from a complicated and 
novel business transaction. The accountants changed their opinion on the 
matter several times, but counsel remained firm on the pivotal issue upon 
which revenue recognition depended.77 If one reviews In re Digi through 
the lens of state law doctrine, there is ample reason to conclude the record 
revealed no evidence rendering the directors’ reliance inappropriate.  
The more troubling question of the directors’ reliance on the disclosure 
advice of the director-counsel arises in the instances described earlier 
where reason suggests that to discharge their state law monitoring 
obligations in self-dealing transactions that the directors’ independence is 
seriously compromised if they are advised solely by the attorney-director. 
To illustrate this, consider the facts of the classic decision in United States 
v. Dixon.78 Lloyd Dixon, president of AVM Corporation, concealed 
substantial loans he received from AVN by repaying the loans (with funds 
borrowed from others) just before the close of the fiscal year. He defended 
his non disclosure of the loans on the firm’s Form 10-K and proxy 
statements by arguing he believed, albeit erroneously, that loans to 
company officers need be disclosed only if they were outstanding at the 
end of the fiscal year. The court rejected this defense, relying upon a trial 
 74. The classic work on this subject is Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on 
Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
 75. The defendant seeking to invoke the defense must prove that “[1] he made complete 
disclosure to counsel, [2] sought advice as to the legality of his conduct, [3] received advice that his 
conduct was legal, and [4] relied on that advice in good faith.” Markowski v. SEC, 34 F.3d 99, 105 (2d 
Cir. 1994). See also SEC v. Savoy Ind., Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 76. Exchange Act Release No. 00-3162 [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 91,467, at 96,794 (July 25, 2001) (8th Cir. 2001). 
 77. Id. at 96,796. 
 78. 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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court finding that Dixon knew that the SEC rule required disclosure of any 
loans above specified amounts to company officers during the year—
regardless of whether they were outstanding at the end of the year.79 Now, 
consider what the position would be if the issue is whether the directors 
who signed the Form 10-K had recklessly committed a disclosure 
violation.  
The most intriguing interface between directors’ state law obligations 
and their disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws arises in 
the self-dealing context. Certainly, we would not wish for AVM’s 
directors to rely on Dixon regarding how the loans should be treated on the 
forthcoming Form 10-K. In re Digi supports the view that the outside 
directors can rely on outside counsel. Although that case did not concern a 
matter of self-dealing, it did focus on when the company could recognize 
revenue, which could indirectly affect, for example the bonuses of 
managers so that their neutrality on the outcome of the attorney’s opinion 
is a matter of great interest to them. However, does some of the protective 
shield of In re Digi disappear if the advising attorney is a boardroom 
colleague? As seen earlier, this dual relationship seems to pose a serious 
conflict under state law. Because independence goes to the process—a 
matter that is exclusively before the states, whereas scienter bears upon the 
directors’ state of mind—the conclusions one reaches on reliance upon 
counsel in the former context need not guide you in the latter. Certainly, 
the elements of a recklessness inquiry that bear upon the directors’ state of 
mind should allow inquiry into whether they foolishly relied upon counsel. 
In making this inquiry, the insights from Part III assume special 
prominence. Just as reliance would appear unjustified if the AVM 
directors were aware of Dixon’s yearly reversal of the loans, should not 
their reliance be misplaced when it is reposed upon counsel whose on-
going relationship with the firm was dependent upon Dixon’s approval? 
Here prudence would appear to call for a second opinion, much as 
occurred in In re Digi. Failure to do so, and the directors’ reliance upon 
counsel, could well be reckless. At the same time, their willingness to seek 
a second opinion, as seen earlier, likely will be compromised when the 
attorney has a dual capacity. Furthermore, failing to obtain another 
opinion under these circumstances likely suggests recklessness on the part 
of the directors because they have thereby incurred a known risk that the 
disclosure advice they are receiving is compromised because of their own 
reluctance to obtain independent advice. Thus, the directors may lose the 
 79. Id. at 1395. 
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benefit of the defense of reliance upon counsel when their attorney has a 
dual relationship with the firm. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no data indicating how frequently the attorney serves on his 
client’s board. Casual conversation suggests this is the exception and not 
the rule. Attorneys who agree to so serve are not acting unprofessional, but 
they do incur additional burdens in so doing. The analysis of this Article 
shows concerns not yet considered in the long debate on the desirability 
and implications of dual service. As shown here, the costs of dual service 
for both the client and the attorney are much greater than has been 
captured by earlier commentators. Even so seen, the competitive legal 
landscape is such that we can expect dual service not merely to grow with 
time as law firms become increasingly concerned about securing their 
relationship with the corporate client. If this occurs, the implications 
examined here will no doubt become reality. 
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